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Ducharme was getting requests to speak to other groups, 
and to the idea of the PMD as a general piece of city 
legislation. The PMD idea generated support in several 
city departments as part of a larger administration concern 
with industrial retention. 
In the fall of 1987, the problem had reached a crisis 
point.  The growth coalition forces mobilized. The Chicago 
Tribune editorialized:
Mr. Washington has let his economic planners 
embark on a zany crusade to snuff out commercial 
and residential growth in areas that they – these 
insulated City Hall planners – have decreed should 
be reserved for manufacturing. Investors who 
want to convert abandoned old factory buildings 
into job-producing, tax-producing commercial 
complexes are told no, take your money to some 
other city. And don’t think they won’t, if Chicago 
continues this perverse ideological nonsense. 
But there had been so much debate within city hall, and 
such development of the coalition of manufacturers, labor 
unions and neighborhood organizations supporting the 
larger PMD proposal, that Mayor Harold Washington came 
out with support within a few days. After a long silence, 
this seemed to cement the PMD policy. 
The Coalition
The coalition transcended the individual. Ducharme’s 
efforts were heroic, but they occurred in parallel with 
the remarkable mobilization of the long repressed black 
population of the city around Washington’s mayoral 
candidacy in 1982, the ready response and support from a 
neighborhood constituency that had created major coalition 
units like the Chicago Association of Neighborhood 
Development Organizations (CANDO), the Rehab 
Network, and the Community Workshop on Economic 
Development (CWED), with many other supporting 
institutions and local foundations.  These came into play 
during the Washington administration as several planning 
and development agencies, now headed by neighborhood 
friendly offi cials, distributed funding and authority to them 
and gave them seats on task forces and committees, while 
generally expanding a sense of participatory oppportunity.
This atmosphere, if not the specifi cs of administrative 
control, continued beyond Washington and the interim 
mayoralty of Eugene Sawyer (1987-89) into the long term 
regime of William M. Daley (1989-2011) who, while he ran 
on a downtown growth coalition platform and specifi cally 
denounced the PMD idea, found himself catering to 
neighborhood interests and industrial retention policies. 
Most visible was Daley’s turnaround and support 
for the PMD concept. Working with holdover elements 
in City Hall, Daley suported a set of “Industrial Corridor” 
studies, created an additional 12 PMDs on top of the 
one initiated in 1988, and in 1993 he hired Ducharme as 
Deputy Commissioner for industrial planning. Ducharme 
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City planners, architects and their supporters often 
think of “speaking truth to power.” Typical examples are 
public works projects or real estate developments that look 
good on paper, but pose long run and less visible costs to 
a neighborhood or the city as a whole.  Many note that 
speaking up in cases like this can be diffi cult, since their 
most important clients tend to have a lot of power, and can 
be selective in what “truth” they are able to hear.  
This is a dilemma that has dogged planners for a 
century. The usual response has been to suggest courage and 
persistence, with guidance offered through case histories 
of remarkable instances where truth-telling actually had an 
impact. However, there are relatively few such cases.1  In 
contrast, scholars have noted that the dominant “power” in 
cities in the past several decades is the “growth coalition,” 
consisting of real estate developers, architects, engineers, 
planners, newspapers and building trades fi rms and unions 
that gain from the construction and other accompaniments 
of “growth.” “Justice” is low on the list of priorities for 
these projects, or among the outcomes. Overall, the growth 
coalition is really, really powerful. 
In the face of this combination of forces, the idea that 
individuals can make a difference by “speaking truth to 
power” is just optimistic. Briefl y, my premise is that the 
only way to compete with the growth coalition is to create 
a different coalition, and to fi nd grounds for support in 
fundamental forces within the economy.  I illustrate this 
with a story of both (a) an organizer, who found a way 
to make a difference; and (b) the forces around her, that 
created a semblance of a coalition, so that her efforts paid 
off, at least for a few years. 
The Organizer
The organizer is Donna Ducharme, who was hired 
in 1982 as the community development director for an 
expanded YMCA program north of the Chicago loop. She 
sought employment opportunities for neighborhood youth, 
and noticed that nearby factories were closing due, not just 
to general economic forces, but to real estate developers 
responding to market demand to convert loft factories 
to residential uses. Why not protect the facctories, she 
reasoned, and satisfy the residential demand elsewhere? 
She hit upon a device, the “planned manufacturing district” 
(PMD) and promoted it to factory owners, neighborhood 
groups, and City Hall. It was diffi cult, she faced many 
obstacles but persisted. By 1986 and 1987, industrial 
displacement was threatening jobs in other parts of the city, 
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embellished the PMD and the industrial retention 
idea by organizing: she created committees including 
manufacturers and neighborhood representatives, initiated 
joint purchasing and warehousinng schemes, and promoted 
sectoral labor supply strategies. 
Questions hung in the air as Daley relinquished 
the mayoralty to Rahm Emanuel in 2011. The Chicago 
industrial retention effort had been a textbook model, but 
did it matter? Part of the answer was in the continued vitality 
of the city’s industrial sectors – manufacturing, while 
diminished within the city (and nation) was restructuring 
so as to play a continued role in the regional economy. 
And this had been despite Daley’s sporadic support, which 
seemed diverted toward downtown offi ces, tourism and 
upscale near-loop residential projects after the mid-1990s. 
But at a minimum, Ducharme and the coalition she 
helped create answered the “Speaking Truth to Power 
question: it takes a coalition with an economic basis, and 
Chicago showed how to do that in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Chicago had an economic basis: Chicago was losing 
manufacturing jobs, but there were still 225,307 Chicagoans 
employed in that sector in 1990, at average wages well 
above what would be  available to the unemployed. And 
surveys demonstrated that many of the manufacturing 
fi rms would stay in business if the real estate pressure could 
be relieved.  Thus there really was “truth” to Ducharme’s 
message – the function of the coalition was to mobilize it.
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